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Tort Actions Between Husband and Wife
Catherine H. Hotes*
AT COMMON LAW, the legal existence of the wife was merged
in that of her husband. They were regarded as one person
in law, and the husband was that person. He had almost com-
plete control over his wife, who was in a condition of dependence
and was bound to obey her husband. As a result of this unity,
she alone, in most cases, could not sue a third person in tort to
enforce her rights; such action had to be prosecuted by husband
and wife jointly. Of course, it would be absurd for a husband to
join his wife in an action against himself. Nor could the husband
sue the wife. By doing so, he would be suing himself because
husband and wife were regarded as one.
This state of affairs continued until about 1844, when statutes
known as Married Women's Acts, or Emancipation Acts, were
passed in all American jurisdictions. These statutes, differing
widely in language, were designed primarily to secure to a mar-
ried woman a separate legal identity and a separate legal estate
in her own property. Generally speaking, they confer upon mar-
ried women the separate ownership and control of their own
property, and the capacity to sue or be sued without joinder of
the husband. The wife is made separately responsible for her
own torts.
In the majority of states, the statutes have no express pro-
vision with respect to personal tort actions between spouses. In-
stead, they provide in general language that married women may
sue separately for torts committed against them and that they
may sue and be sued as though they were unmarried.' In most
of these states, however, the courts have held that such statutes
do not abrogate the common law rule of spousal immunity.2
* B.A., in Economics, West. Res. Univ.; and a Third-year student at Cleve-
land-Marshall Law School.
1 43 A. L. R. 2d 632, 651 (1955).
2 Baker v. Gaffney, 141 F. Supp. 602 (D. C. D. C., 1956); Spellens v. Spel-
lens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P. 2d 613 (1957); Owens v. Owens, 149 A. 2d 320
(Del., 1959); Wallach v. Wallach, 94 Ga. App. 576, 95 S. E. 2d 750 (1956);
Hary v. Arney, 145 N. E. 2d 575 (Ind., 1957); Scholle v. Home Mut. Casualty
Co., 273 Wis. 387, 78 N. W. 2d 902 (1956); (applying Kansas law); Libby v.
Berry, 74 Me. 286, 43 Am. Rep. 589 (1883); Furstenburg v. Furstenburg,
152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927); Ronan v. Ronan, 159 N. E. 2d 653 (Mass.,
1959); Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 214 N. W. 305 (1927); Koenigs v.
Travis, 246 Minn. 254, 75 N. W. 2d 478 (1956); Tobias v. Tobias, 225 Miss.
(Continued on next page)
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However, the contrary result has been reached in a substantial
minority of jurisdictions.3
The New York statute expressly allows one spouse to sue
the other for personal injuries.4 A Louisiana statute, which bars
married women from suing their husband, except for certain
divorce and property actions, has been construed as barring a
suit for personal injuries during coverture.5 On the other hand,
the Illinois statute expressly provides that neither spouse may
sue the other for a personal tort committed during coverture.6
In adhering to or rejecting the common law rule, the courts
have stated various reasons for their holdings, but the difference
in result can almost always be traced to a different interpreta-
tion of the applicable Married Women's Acts. As Sanford points
out:
The immediate problem is thus primarily a matter of statu-
tory construction. While in a few cases the decisions have
turned upon some specific language in the particular statute,
on the whole the decisions have been based upon general
(Continued from preceding page)
392, 83 So. 2d 638 (1955); Smith v. Smith, 300 S. W. 2d 275 (Mo. App.,
1957); Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S. W. 2d 808 (Mo., 1959); Conley v.
Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P. 2d 922 (1932); Emerson v. Western Seed and
Irrig. Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N. W. 297 (1927); Koplik v. C. P. Truck-
ing Corp., 27 N. J. 1, 141 A. 2d 34 (1958); Romero v. Romero, 58 N. M.
201, 269 P. 2d 748 (1954); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 287 P. 2d 572 (1955);
Johnson v. Johnson, 394 Pa. 116, 145 A. 2d 716 (1958); Oken v. Oken, 44
R. I. 291, 117 A. 903 (1934); Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S. W.
628 (1915); Crawford v. DeLong, 324 S. W. 2d 25 (Tex., 1959); Levlock v.
Spanos, 101 N. H. 22, 131 A. 2d 319 (1957) (applying Vermont law); Vigilant
Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 197 Va. 216, 89 S. E. 2d 69 (1955); Schultz v. Christopher,
65 Wash. 496, 118 P. 629 (1911); Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S. E.
604 (1935); McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P. 2d 940 (1943).
3 Hamilton v. Hamilton, 255 Ala. 284, 51 So. 2d 13 (1950); Jaeger v. Jaeger,
262 Wis. 14, 53 N. W. 2d 740 (1952) (stating Arizona rule); Leach v. Leach, 227
Ark. 599, 300 S. W. 2d 15 (1957); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 42 P. 2d 740
(1935); Silverman v. Silverman, 145 Conn. 663, 145 A. 2d 826 (1958); Al-
exander v. Alexander, 140 F. Supp. 925 (D. C. S. C., 1956) (applying Florida
law); Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P. 2d 733 (1949); Brown v. Gosser,
262 S. W. 2d 480 (Ky., 1953); Priddle v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co.,
100 N. H. 73, 119 A. 2d 97 (1955); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Jacek, 156 F.
Supp. 43 (D. C. N. J., 1957) (applying New York law); Lamb v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Misc. 2d 236, 161 N. Y. S. 2d 703 (1941); Fitzmaurice v.
Fitzmaurice, 62 N. D. 191, 242 N. W. 526 (1932); Lowman v. Lowman, 166
Ohio St. 1, 139 N. E. 2d 1 (1956); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87
P. 2d 660 (1938); Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S. C. 129, 166 S. E. 101 (1932);
Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S. D. 53, 298 N. W. 266 (1941); Taylor v. Patten,
2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P. 2d 696 (1954); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N. W.
475 (1926).
4 N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law, § 57.
5 Edwards v. Royal Indemnity co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935); Palmer
v. Edwards, 155 So. 483 (La. App., 1934).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat., C. 68, § 1 (1953). Boker v. Boker, 17 Ill. App. 2d 260, 149




principles of statutory construction considered in the light
of the social theories and interests involved.7
Reasons Supporting Majority and Minority Views
A. Preservation of Domestic Peace
The major argument used by the courts for supporting ad-
herence to the common law rule of spousal immunity is that con-
tinued application of the rule is necessary to safeguard marital
harmony and domestic accord.s Prosser criticizes this argument,
doubting that denial of legal remedies will sooth an angry and
aggrieved wife. 9
Courts which have rejected the common law rule of spousal
immunity have also rejected this argument as lacking in sub-
stance.' 0
B. Province of the Legislature
In supporting the common law rule, the courts have also fre-
quently said that statutes in derogation of common law must be
strictly construed. Actions between spouses for personal torts are
not expressly provided for in the Married Women's Acts nor, say
these courts, is their authorization necessarily implied." If the
abrogation of the common law rule is desirable, it is a problem
calling for legislative action and it lies outside the sphere of
proper judicial action.' 2 In Ensminger v. Ensminger,13 the Mis-
7 Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 823, 826
(1956).
8 47 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla., 1950). See also: Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 86
App. D. C. 327, 181 F. 2d 626 (1950); Holman v. Holman, 73 Ga. App. 205,
35 S. E. 2d 923 (1945); Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239 P. 2d 933 (1952);
David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755 (1932); Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117
Mich. 80, 75 N. W. 287 (1898); Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 263
N. W. 546 (1935); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924); Rogers
v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S. W. 382 (1915); Emerson v. Western Seed and
Irrig. Co., supra, n. 2; Kennedy v. Camp, 14 N. J. 390, 102 A. 2d 595 (1954);
Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, supra, n. 2; Morgan v. Leuck, 137 W. Va. 546, 72
S. E. 2d 825 (1952).
9 Prosser, Torts, 674 (2d ed., 1955).
10 Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914). Lorang v. Hays, supra, n.
3. Brandt v. Keller, 413 Ill. 503, 109 N. E. 2d 729 (1952). Brown v. Gosser,
supra, n. 3. Courtney v. Courtney, supra, n. 3. Scotvold v. Scotvold, supra,
n. 3. Wait v. Pierce, supra n. 3.
11 Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe supra, n. 2. Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 96
S. E. 315 (1918). Poling v. Poling, supra, n. 2.
12 Paulus v. Bauder, 106 Cal. App. 2d 589, 235 P. 2d 422 (1951); Wright v.
Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S. E. 2d 152 (1952); Henneger v. Lomas, 145
Ind. 287, 44 N. E. 462 (1896); Karalis v. Karalis, 213 Minn. 31, 4 N. W. 2d
632 (1942); Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 896, 62 S. W. 2d 1084 (1933); Emerson
v. Western Seed and Irrig. Co., supra, n. 2; Oken v. Oken, supra, n. 2; Corn-
stock v. Comstock, 106 Vt. 50, 169 A. 903 (1934).
13 222 Miss. 799, 77 So. 2d 308 (1955).
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sissippi Supreme Court said that granting a wife the right to sue
her husband is fraught with such far-reaching results that it
should not be made by judicial fiat, but should be granted only
through legislative processes.
C. Encouragement of Litigation
In support of the no-torts-between-spouses view, the courts
have said that to allow such actions would be to encourage base-
less and trivial actions brought out of spite rather than merit.
In Thompson v. Thompson,14 the Supreme Court held that, under
the law of the District of Columbia, a wife could not bring an
action against her husband for assault and battery. To permit
such an action would open the doors of the courts to accusations
of all sorts by one spouse against the other, and bring into public
notice claims for assault, slander, and libel, and alleged in-
juries to the property of the one or the other, by husband against
wife, or wife against husband.
In some cases, the courts indicated their belief that, where
the defendant was protected by insurance, the allowance of such
actions would encourage collusion and fraud.15 In New York,
special statutory protection has been afforded insurers. It pro-
vides that no insurance policy issued shall be deemed to in-
sure against any liability of an insured for injuries to the person
or property of the insured's spouse, unless an express provision
is included in the policy.' 6
However, courts adopting the rule that such actions can be
maintained have said that there is no more danger of collusion
in such cases than in many others and that such a contention is
no basis for denying liability.17 In Brown v. Brown,' the Ken-
tucky court commented that it was not willing to admit that
courts are so ineffectual, or the jury system so imperfect, that
fraudulent claims cannot be detected and disposed of accord-
ingly.
14 Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611 (1910).
15 Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39, 198 N. E. 320 (1935); Harvey v. Harvey,
Mich., supra, n. 2; Smith v. Smith, Oregon, supra, n. 2.
16 N. Y. Ins. Law, § 167 (3).
17 Brandt v. Keller, supra, n. 10. Brown v. Gosser, supra, n. 3. Courtney v.
Courtney, supra, n. 3.




D. Availability of Other Remedies
In those jurisdictions where spouses cannot sue each other
for personal injuries, the courts have said that criminal and
divorce laws afford married persons adequate remedies, and are
sufficient to protect society's interest in their prevention. 19 In a
Minnesota case,20 a husband was denied the right to enjoin his
wife from committing tortious acts toward him. The court said
that neither husband nor wife is without an appropriate remedy,
since the divorce courts are open to both parties and, where the
misconduct complained of is of a criminal nature, the criminal
laws will furnish adequate protection.
On the other hand, proponents of the abrogation of the com-
mon law rule have pointed out that if the right of a spouse to
bring a personal injury action against the other is denied, the in-
jured spouse has no other adequate remedy.2 1 An Alabama
court stated that the remedies of divorce or criminal prosecu-
tion available to a wife injured in her person by her husband
were entirely illusory and inadequate.22
Type of Tort
In applying the rule of spousal disability, most of the courts
have drawn no distinction between intentional and unintentional
torts.2 3 For example, in a Georgia case, the court ruled that
since the common law was not changed by statute in Georgia,
neither spouse could sue the other in tort, regardless of whether
the civil action was based upon simple negligence, wilful mis-
conduct, or wanton and malicious conduct.2 4
Oregon, however, apparently distinguishes between negligent
torts and wilful torts. In the latter case, the harmony of the home
has been so damaged that there is no danger that it will be further
impaired by maintenance of action. 25 Missouri now permits the
wife to maintain an action against the administrator of her hus-
19 Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 P. 219 (1909); Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me.
304, 24 Am. Rep. 27 (1877); Austin v. Austin, supra, n. 8.
20 Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N. W. 624 (1920).
21 Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 206 (1920); Courtney v. Court-
ney, supra, n. 3.
22 Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917).
23 See Annot., 43 A. L. R. 2d 632, 636 (1955).
24 Wright v. Wright, supra, n. 12.
25 Smith v. Smith, Oregon, supra, n. 2 (involving action for injuries sus-
tained in automobile accident); Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 242, 287 P. 2d 585
(1955) (involving action for intentional tort).
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band's estate for wilful, wanton, and intentional wrongdoing in
the operation of an automobile in which the wife was a passenger
and the husband the driver. The court held that since these cir-
cumstances do not infringe on any reasons of policy, the Married
Women's Acts and the survivors' statutes do not preclude the
action. 26
Premarital Torts
In states where a spouse cannot sue the other spouse for
personal injuries, it is generally held that the rule is applicable to
premarital torts.2 7 Thus, for example, in Patenaude v. Paten-
aude,28 it was held that the fact that the tort was committed prior
to marriage did not affect spousal immunity. The court said that
this was the only logical conclusion. The common law immunity
also applied to premarital torts. If the statute modified the com-
mon law as to suits between spouses, it changed that law as to
all such suits, whether the wrong was committed before or after
the marriage. But since it had previously been held that the
statute did not change the common law as to torts committed
during coverture, it could not be said that it did change the
common law in the case at bar.
In North Carolina, however, the rule of disability has been
held inapplicable to a premarital tort on the theory that a wo-
man's liability for torts was not affected by marriage under the
language of the applicable statute. 29 In a 1955 Missouri case, it
was also held that a wife could maintain an action against her
husband for personal injuries arising out of an automobile acci-
dent which occurred prior to the marriage, even though the
action was brought after marriage.30 In 1957, a New Jersey court
held that a personal injury action by an injured passenger against
the operator of the automobile did not abate when the female
passenger married the male operator while the action was pending.
26 Ennis v. Truhitte, 306 S. W. 2d 549 (Mo., 1957).
27 Baker v. Gaffney, supra, n. 2; Hunter v. Livingston, 125 Ind. App. 422,
123 N. E. 2d 912 (1955); Coster v. Coster, 289 N. Y. 438, 46 N. E. 2d 509
(1943) (stating Massachusetts rule); Scales v. Scales, 168 Miss. 439, 151 So.
551 (1934); Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S. W. 2d 263 (1932); Furey
v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 71 S. E. 2d 191 (1952); Morgan v. Leuck, supra, n. 8;
Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki, 142 Conn. 278, 113 A. 2d 509 (1955) (applying
Pennsylvania law).
28 Patenaude v. Patenaude, supra, n. 8.
29 Shirley v. Ayers, 201 N. C. 51, 158 S. E. 840 (1931).
30 Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S. W. 2d 642 (Mo., 1955). See also Berry v.




Where the underlying policy of 'domestic peace and felicity'
is not factually implicated, the rule will not be mechanically
applied by the courts. . . Where the reason for the immunity
does not obtain, the case calls for appropriate modification
of the rule.3 1
Similar decisions were reached in California and in New
Hampshire in 1959.32
Effect of Invalid Marriage or Annulment
In an Indiana case involving an action for premarital seduc-
tion, the court held that, where the marriage of the parties was
shown to be invalid, the rule of spousal disability was inapplicable
so that the wife could bring such an action against her husband.
The court added that the rule of spousal disability would be
similarly inapplicable if the marriage of the parties was annulled
because of the under-age of one of them, and the annulment pre-
ceded the institution of the seduction suit.3 3
However, the spousal disability rule was applied in a
Massachusetts case to bar an action by a wife against her hus-
band for negligence. It was held that the common law rule pre-
vailed even though the marriage was annulled prior to the com-
mencement of the wife's action. The court said that, although
an annulment generally makes the marriage void for almost every
purpose, there is a well-recognized exception in the case of oc-
currences during the period of the supposed marriage. It should
be noted that the court indicated that its holding of spousal dis-
ability was tied to the fact that the marriage was annulled on
the ground of fraud. Implicit in the court's opinion is the idea
that, had the marriage been one prohibited by law there would
not have been spousal disability.34
The spousal disability rule was also applied in a Texas case
to bar a tort action by a wife against her husband for malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment, notwithstanding that at the
time she brought the action, the marriage had been annulled.
The court took the view that whatever cause of action the wife
31 Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., supra, n. 2.
32 Foote v. Foote, 339 P. 2d 188 (Calif., 1959); Morin v. Letourneau, 156
A. 2d 131 (New Hampshire, 1959).
33 Henneger v. Lomas, supra, n. 12.
34 Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N. E. 2d 637 (1948); but cf. Langley
v. Schumacker, 46 Cal. 2d 601, 297 P. 2d 977 (1956), where wife could main-
tain action against former husband for his fraud in marrying her with
secret intention not to consummate marriage, even though she secured an-
nulment on the ground of such fraud.
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had, accrued when the tortious acts were committed, but the
marital relationship barred the cause of action from accruing.35
Effect of Divorce
It is well settled that the common law rule of spousal dis-
ability presupposes the marital relationship and has no appli-
cability to torts committed after divorce against a former spouse.
Where an interlocutory decree of divorce had been entered, but
before the entry of the final decree, a California court held that
the entry of the interlocutory decree did not sever the marital
bonds. So spousal disability still applied.3 6 On the other hand,
although recognizing the District of Columbia rule of spousal dis-
ability, a federal District Court in Steele v. Steele37 held that a
wife might sue her husband for assault he committed upon her
after a decree of absolute divorce had been entered, but before
the expiration of the six-month period prior to the effective date
of the decree. The court said that, although the marriage was
not entirely dissolved, the status of husband and wife lacked its
original character. In fact, the court added, the marriage re-
lationship which gives rise to the principle of spousal disability
did not continue until the expiration of the six-month period but
was held in suspended animation.
In the case of a spouse's post-divorce suit for personal in-
juries caused by the other spouse during coverture, the courts
agree that the spousal disability rule bars the suit,38 based on
the theory that no cause of action arose during coverture and a
subsequent divorce cannot create a cause of action where none
existed at the time the events occurred. The courts also rely on
the contention that all of the rights of the parties were de-
termined in the divorce proceeding and settled by the divorce
decree. However, a Louisiana court took a different view in
Gremillion v. Caffey 39 and held that, since a divorce dissolves the
bonds of matrimony, it terminates a wife's incapacity to sue her
husband for a tort committed during coverture.
35 Lunt v. Lunt, 121 S. W. 2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App., 1938).
36 Paulus v. Bauder, supra, n. 12.
37 65 F. Supp. 329 (D. C. D. C., 1946).
38 Abbott v. Abbott, supra, n. 19; Koenigs v. Travis, supra, n. 2; Callow v.
Thomas, supra, n. 34; Bandfield v. Bandfield, supra, n. 8; Nickerson v. Nick-
erson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886); Lunt v. Lunt, supra, n. 35; Schultz v. Christopher,
supra, n. 2; Wallach v. Wallach, supra, n. 2.





About one-third of the states have abrogated the common
law rule of spousal disability. Only in New York has a statute
been enacted which expressly provides that one spouse may
bring a personal injury action against the other.40 Florida4' and
Kentucky 42 have only recently abandoned the common law rule.
• . . We may view with no more than historical interest Lord
Bacon's statement in his Abridgement, Title Baron and
Femme B., that: "The husband hath by law, power and do-
minion over his wife, and may keep her by force within the
bounds of duty, and may beat her, but not in a violent or
cruel manner." And only the more hardy among legal
writers have the temerity to quote the statement even for
that purpose. 43
And, in 1957, a California court recognized the existence of the
common law rule in California but suggested that it may be
abandoned:
The rule was originally formulated by this court in reliance
upon a now outmoded common law rule, and if this court
becomes convinced that the rule is unwise it should see fit
to change it. 4 4
The courts in some of the recent cases have attempted to
formulate a rule which would secure all the social interests in-
volved rather than adhere to either the inflexible rule of dis-
ability or the equally inflexible rule of no disability.
It is the virtue of the common law that as mores changes, the
law will also change.45
40 Supra, n. 4.
41 Alexander v. Alexander, supra, n. 3.
42 Brown v. Gosser, supra, n. 3.
43 Ibid., at q84.
44 Spellens v. Spellens, supra, n. 2, 633.
45 Apitz v. Dames, supra, n. 25. See also Taylor v. Patten, supra, n. 3.
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